Ukrajina

[JoseMujica]

[corolla02]

[sumirprimus]

[sumirprimus]

Pik granica

[sumirprimus]

Mali bub, ili bubić

[sumirprimus]

Cime? Nove procjene amera, ruje su sprzile 1/3 bobrenih snaga na ukrajini.
Koje su poslali, a to je ootprilike vecina njiovih bs

[sumirprimus]

Dakle za ove sto pricaju da se moglo izbjec i da provociraju sa natom.jos 2008 su ameri preko kondolize rajs govorili sta je cilj putina, no evropljani svabe i francuzi bili narsvno kocnicari

[LipeCvat]

ko ono upita za požare

[sumirprimus]

[sumirprimus]

Muzika za usi

[sumirprimus]

[Zumbul2]

ko ono upita za požare
Ja sam vala spomenuo što ih nema..

[saimidin]

Da to ja govorim od pocetka da orci vrse genocid, ravnaju I unistavaju redom gradove I sela, ali neki bi da se igraju semantike, a znamo I koji

Mislim da ce se tek saznati za sve sto se desava I desiti ce se ukrajincima hersona I okolnih mjesta odakle nisu uspjeli pobjeci prije nego su orci poklopili, tamo ce objekti ostati ali ljudi ce nestati ili (p)ostati orci

Staljin bi bio ponosan na ucenika putlera

[drug_profi]

Kad je grad lijep i onda i rusevine izgledaju lijepo.
Sve planski izgrađeno, urbanizovano, a svaka kuca ima i cestu i veliko zemljiste iza. More na dohvat.

[sumirprimus]

"Mr. President: we made it. Today, May 15, 2022...we reached the border of the Russian Federation."

[Nespin]

[Bossona]

Protjeraše okupatora i izađoše na granicu okupatorske Rusije nokon što su odbranili drugi najveći grad Kharkiv.

[Mrvice_ba]

Sad da udare po belogradu, nista manje nego Rusi po harkivu.

[sumirprimus]

Glupost. Samo ce dati municiju putinu. Sad sjec vovcansk i izum.

[Satrap_Darije]

Je li ukrajinski rat naš rat?
Boris Dežulović

https://hr.n1info.com/kolumne/boris-dez ... t-nas-rat/

[trambusek88]

Remiza u Mariupolu - flashback

[elk]

Vala bas. Isto ko cetalji. Mater jebli bijednu.

[japin_mutapi]

kakva mračna vizija je rusija i ruski svijet
imperija zla, zaista

[geralt]

Poljski pilot pise o ruskoj i ukrajinskoj avijaciji, prevod na engleski sa Reddita:

Spoiler

Show

Slowly, gradually, although it is still a long way off, Ukraine is beginning to take the initiative. Its planes have appeared in the sky again, a sight that fills one with hope.

What is happening on the front? Unfortunately, Rubižne has finally fallen, or rather the place covered in ruins where the town of that name stood at the beginning of the year. The defenders retreated to Severodonetsk. Here, too, it is difficult, because the troops are supplied through Donets, which is presumably the last bridge, damaged anyway, or maybe through some fords or a pontoon bridge. This we do not know completely.

Both Rubizhne and Severodonetsk lie on the east bank of the river, which for the Russian troops is an obstacle as impermeable as the fence on the Polish border with Belarus. That is why the Ukrainians, retreating from here, have blown up the bridge over the smaller river at Voivodivka between the towns. They are also systematically repelling attempts to cross the Donets near Yampol and attacks on the other fronts - from Severodonetsk to the area south of Zaporozhye. No change on other sections. The Kharkov and Kherson regions temporarily calmed down. Both sides of the conflict have directed all their efforts to the Donbas.

Ukrainian forces have sunk another Russian ship, admittedly an auxiliary one and rather from the medium-small category (i.e. not so small again as, for example, landing boats, probably liquidated in full in the Black Sea). This time it's about the brand new supply equipment "Vselevod Bobrov" (built in 2016), hit near Snake Island. It is more or less equivalent to our ORP "Kontradmirał Xawery Czernicki", but newer.

One gets the impression that combat aviation plays a rather limited role in Ukraine. For two reasons. First, after years of underinvestment, military aviation was relatively outdated and numerically weak. All aircraft are from the Soviet era; they have only recently been modestly modernised. Ukraine produced air-to-air guided missiles but suffered from a lack of precision weaponry for ground targets. The situation was slightly better in the air force's radio-technical and anti-aircraft troops, its two pillars, apart from aviation.

The greatest surprise is the weakness of the Russian air force. The Russians had won an advantage in the skies in the first days of the war, a state in which they could operate fairly freely, while the opposing side was severely restricted. They did not exploit this advantage. It was not followed by a series of precision attacks that would have brought the country to paralysis, bridges over major rivers and the main communication routes crossing them were not destroyed, command posts were not destroyed, and a hail of guided bombs and rockets did not fall on armoured military vehicles or guns....

This is not an American-style air campaign, when fighter-bomber planes and attack helicopters completely cleared the way for their own ground troops, stopped the enemy in his tracks, and did not allow effective counterattacks on the wings. Tomahawk precision wing missiles were used in a massed manner, mainly on the first night, to completely infect a specific network - the command, control air defence system and key communication nodes in the most heavily defended areas. The effect of rendering the opponent helpless and decisionless in a theatre of war is only achieved if all known command posts, communication nodes and headquarters are hit at once. Otherwise, the command will be taken over by reserve, advanced and rear positions or simply the command posts of neighbouring formations will be taken over by "stray" troops. The attack must be well thought out, energetic and massed.

The famous "Shock and Awe" concept, shock and horror, presupposes precisely a sudden and simultaneous attack on a specific area of enemy operations. Meanwhile, the Russians have fired nearly one and a half thousand long-range ballistic and winged missiles for deep strikes over two and a half months. And what did they concentrate on? On nothing. And they got an adequate result. They knocked down a department store, a petrol depot, a block of flats or a warehouse in the port, and another time they blew up a huge crater near the railway tracks, adding variety to the landscape for passing drivers. A few missed rockets fell into the rivers some distance from the bridges, showering them with silt thrown up from the bottom and a fountain of water. Probably in the hope that a steel railway bridge so treated would rust and sink on its own.

By the way, the low accuracy of the precision Russian missiles is quite puzzling.... What have they screwed up again? Are the guidance systems using GPS or their native Glonass, or are the Ukrainians effectively jamming their signals? It is known that for interfering with GPS/Glonass signals Ukraine has mobile Polonez interference stations (on a semi-truck) and portable Anklaw stations (two modules weighing 15 kg each), developed by the Kyiv-based Ukrspectechnika company, operating in a specific area. American winged missiles using a precision inertial navigation system with laser gyroscopes, which had DSMAC (Digital Scene Matching Area Correlator) correction, i.e. comparing a digital map of the terrain with the image from the missile's camera, hit with an accuracy of 5-10m, doing without GPS. Meanwhile, Russian missiles, if their navigation does not work, have an accuracy comparable to the German V-1...

The planes themselves rarely use bombs and guided missiles, and ordinary bombs are dropped with varying accuracy. I remember my first bombing from a horizontal flight on the firing range at Jagodne near Lukow in 1984. Flying on a Lim-2 (MiG-15 bis of the Mielec variety), I released a training bomb at what I thought was the right distance from the target, and the bomb flew, flew, flew, passed the target, flew, flew

Nowadays, the Russians have digital ballistic computers on their planes - I know one on a Su-22 and I must admit that it worked very well. But you have to fly low, the whole thing requires some skill to aim a series of bombs properly - it's more or less like juggling five plates. I know a lot of people can do it. But try juggling five plates while they are shooting at you...

The result is that the Russian air force, making 250 flights a day (not enough for 300 planes, there should be three or four flights per machine, so 900-1200), does little real damage, unless it bombs cities, in which case yes - the effects are indeed visible. This leads some to the false conclusion that air superiority in a full-scale conflict is of little consequence. But if we look at the Russian military as a whole, even a soldier on the battlefield seems like a relic - instead of fighting, he roams the countryside, robbing and raping.

The Ukrainian air force has never been very strong, as the focus has been on creating an air defence system for the state, direct support of troops and reconnaissance for combat operations. About 70 per cent of the effort of the entire air force was devoted to the former objective. The radio-technical troops set up several mobile radar posts and passive target observation systems, such as the famous Kolczuga (which tracks the enemy by receiving signals from his radars, navigation systems and radio stations). The system still works today and not only allows it to guide fighters and point out targets to its own anti-aircraft missiles, but also to warn the population of attacks.

In addition, the anti-aircraft forces have developed a fairly effective barrage of medium-range anti-aircraft missiles, covering Kyiv, partly Kharkiv, Odesa, Dnieper and Lviv. Today, the Russians do not venture over Kyiv at all, while over Kharkiv they have been shot down quite heavily. Kyiv's anti-aircraft defence is capable of bringing down even an Iskander, using the post-Soviet but perfect for the time S-300W Antey system. Of the aircraft of the Ukrainian air force, most were MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters, capable of aerial combat. These too now adorned the Ukrainian landscape with the smoking wreckage of Russian aircraft, especially at the beginning of the conflict. Enemies capable of air combat were three times as many, but many were disabled at bombed and rocket-attacked airfields.

Here is a lesson for us: aircraft need airports, preferably whole ones. This means that the runway and taxiways should not be riddled with bombs, that fuel depots should not be burnt down, that hangars should not collapse on the planes standing in them, and that the airport should have some kind of traffic service and navigation facilities. Ammunition also needs to be kept somewhere. A meteorological service would be ideal.

Here you can see the importance of airfield repair battalions, special units. I once had the pleasure of observing exercises of the now defunct 14th Airfield Repair Battalion from Elbląg. The soldiers, most of them qualified sappers, were able to check a bomb crater for unexploded ordnance or mines in half an hour, fill it in with special aggregate in two or three hours with the use of dump trucks and bulldozers (stocks of such aggregate are gathered nearby in case of war), and then within an hour put a glass-epoxy mat on it and anchor it with hooks shot into the concrete, which were designed so that even a speeding plane could roll over them.

Several teams could work simultaneously on several funnels in the runway. The battalion also had cranes, prefabricated elements and containers of various sizes so that it could also remove other damage or erect field installations that were very useful during operations. For example, light type hangars - the battalion could erect whole herds of them. And guess which ones contain aircraft and which ones contain nothing.

Unfortunately, the battalion from Elbląg was recklessly disbanded in 2010 and only its twin, the 16th Brig. Stanisław Taczak Airfield Repair Battalion from Jarocin, was left. Ukraine did not take much care of similar units either, and although it managed to move most of its combat aviation to already disused civilian airports, there was a problem with their use here too. At the crucial moment of the war, the Ukrainians had at their disposal only Boryspol near Kyiv, which remained under the missile umbrella of the capital. It is a huge port with many hangars, buildings, two long runways, large parking planes, sizeable repair facilities and so on. Of course, it too was damaged by the Russians, but it was not easily immobilised. On 24 February, the Ukrainians blocked the runways and taxiways with airport equipment to block them, and then used them themselves.

By about mid-April, several (perhaps a dozen) other air bases, probably partly arranged in civilian ports, had been restored to use. At the same time, with considerable effort and after receiving a supply of spare parts, machines were repaired. By the end of April, the activity of Ukraine's warplanes increased from 5-10 departures a day to about 15-40. Fighter planes appeared in the sky again, which caused the bombing of cities, with the exception of Mariupol in occupied territory, to practically cease. Today they are fired only with winged rockets, of which Russia's stock is running out.

Today, the Ukrainian air force, along with the rest of the MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters, mainly uses Su-25 attack aircraft. According to several sources that cannot be verified, five of the approximately 25 Su-25s that Ukraine had at the beginning of the war are operational. They were the ones that helped destroy several pontoon bridges near Lymansk and massacred Russian troops trying to push through Donetsk. These attacks proved, along with the newly deployed M777 howitzers, to be deadly to the enemy, who lost nearly 80 armoured vehicles, mostly combat, but also engineering and sapper vehicles, on just one crossing. A drone photo has been revealed, marking the wreckage of the destroyed equipment, eagerly numbering them to 75 or so. On just this one crossing, we have fully completed equipment for a full battalion battle group - the Russian staff can amend the inventory accordingly by attaching a photo to the destruction report.

The operation of Ukrainian UAVs - the famous Bayraktars operate mainly as part of the air force - will have to be written about separately. But it is worth remembering that piloted aviation is also a deadly weapon and can change the situation on the battlefield. Modern and well used combat aviation can be a real - as they say - game-changer, changing the fate of a war campaign. It just needs to be looked after.

Neki interesantni detalji:

- Ukrajincima je ostalo jos 5 x Su-25 koje koriste za misije od kriticne vaznosti.

- U jednom trenutku su imali samo jedan funkcionalan aerodrom u drzavi pod svojom kontrolom

- Rusi se boje ukrajinskih lovaca, prestali su sa vazdusnim bombardovanjem gradova

- Ukrajinci koriste elektronsko ometanje za ruske rakete, sto je razlog njihove nepreciznosti

- Potvrdjena je ranije vijest iz sredine marta da su Ukrajinci "skinuli" Iskandera pomocu S-300 iznad Kijeva

[drug_profi]

M270 MLRS stigao na bojište