Islamofobija

[IBM]

Posto ima dosta forumasa koji su manje-vise islamofobicni.Mislim da nije losa ideja staviti ovaj tekst:

Is Islamophobia equivalent to racism or anti-Semitism ? The view from the Balkans


There is some resistance among liberal intellectuals to the term ‘Islamophobia’, because it is assumed that Islam is a religion, therefore an ideology, and it is questioned if one can be prejudiced against an ideology. Yet such a distinction is not satisfactory from the standpoint of a scholar of the Balkans; or indeed, from the historical standpoint generally. To treat chauvinism against a religious community as being fundamentally different from chauvinism against an ethnic or racial group is to superimpose a modern understanding of religion onto the past. We may believe in the ideals of the separation of church and state; and of religion as a private, personal matter of conscience; but it is anachronistic to impose this liberal ideal onto past human history.



We are all aware of the distinction between religious and racial anti-Semitism, but also of the connections between the two – of the fact that even the Nazis used religious background to determine who was Jewish. In the Balkans, at least, the model for chauvinism that anti-Semitism provides – in which prejudice against a religious community evolves into an ethnic or racial prejudice - is the rule rather than the exception. Religious and ethnic prejudice are not distinct categories, and it makes no historical sense to see them as such.



The Ottoman Empire ruled over much of the Balkans from the late Middle Ages until the nineteenth century, and it was the Ottoman system that laid the basis for modern ethnicity and nationality in the Balkans. The Ottoman empire was organised on the basis of different legal statuses for Muslims and non-Muslims, in which Muslims were the dominant and privileged group but Christians and Jews nevertheless enjoyed a degree of communal autonomy. This laid the basis for the different religious communities to evolve into separate nationalities.



When the Orthodox nationalities of the Balkans rose up against the Ottoman overlords during the nineteenth century with the goal of establishing their independence from the empire, the process involved the expulsion or extermination of much of the non-Christian population, which was identified as an alien, non-national element. This process of ethnic or religious cleansing was directed primarily against the Muslim population that was concentrated in the towns. But it targeted also the Jews, who were also concentrated in the towns and who were, in the eyes of the predominantly peasant and Christian rebels, equally alien and part of the Ottoman presence. This was something that occurred in the violence that accompanied the uprisings themselves, with rebels spontaneously massacring non-Christians. But it also took place more quietly in the decades that followed the establishment of autonomy or independence, as the new governments encouraged ethnic homogenisation.



Thus, for example, in Serbia during the nineteenth century, the number of mosques in the main cities rapidly declined. The Serbian capital of Belgrade was largely Muslim before the nineteenth century. But following the establishment of an autonomous Serbian principality in the first decades of the nineteenth century, the Muslim population was mostly expelled and most of the mosques were destroyed or dismantled. Similarly, the Jewish communities suffered restrictions they had not suffered in the Ottoman period, and were expelled or relocated from the towns outside Belgrade. This, of course, is a generalisation: the extent to which Muslims or Jews were massacred, expelled or persecuted varied according to country and period. This was not a matter of Nazi-style total extermination. Persecution and expulsion alternated and overlapped with efforts at cooption, assimilation and toleration. But the model of nationhood remained very much one that was based on Orthodox Christianity, in which non-Orthodox were, at best, viewed as less national than the Orthodox.



This model of religiously determined nationhood was not adopted only by Orthodox Christians, but also by the Muslim Turks. The establishment of a Turkish nation-state in the 1910s and 1920s involved the extermination or expulsion of literally millions of Christians. Formally, they were Greeks or Armenians. But this included Turkish-speaking Christians who were excluded from the Turkish nation solely because of their religion. Turkish nationhood, therefore, was based on the Muslim religion: it was inclusive of Kurds and other non-Turkish-speaking Muslims who inhabited Anatolia. But it was exclusive of Turkish-speaking Christians.



After establishing their nation-state, the Turks had a rather better record of treating the Jews than did the Balkan Christians. This was a legacy of the fact that the Muslims, as the elite group in the Ottoman Empire, had not viewed the Jews as outsiders in the same way that the Christians had done. But there was still some anti-Jewish activity on the part of the Turkish state which, with Nazi encouragement, reached its peak during World War II. Furthermore, in the great anti-Greek pogrom in Istanbul in 1955, Jews were also targeted.



Another example serves to illustrate the connection between religion and ethnicity in the Balkans. Both Serbia and Croatia entered the modern age with relatively small Jewish communities that could readily assimilate into the dominant Serbian and Croatian nations respectively. By contrast, in Bosnia there was no dominant nationality. So members of the Sephardic Jewish community in Bosnia developed a distinct sense of nationality of their own. They saw themselves as distinct from the Ashkenazim, who were culturally different. And as they were not oppressed by a dominant nationality that treated them as outsiders, they were less receptive to Zionism than were the Jews of most Central European countries. So the Bosnian Sephardim followed the general Bosnian pattern, whereby the different religious communities evolved into different nationalities.



There were some exceptions to the general rule of religiously based nationhood in the Balkans. The Albanians are the only major example of a Balkan nation for which religion is not the determining factor. The most likely explanation is that Albanian nationalism originated with the Catholic population among the Albanian-speakers. And the Catholics were not legally and economically subordinate to Muslim landlords in the way that Orthodox peasants throughout the Balkans were subordinate to Muslim landlords. So there was not the same degree of class oppression tied into the religious divide between Catholics and Muslims among the Albanian-speakers, as there was between Orthodox and Muslims among the Slavic-, Greek- and Turkish-speaking peoples. Interestingly, the Albanians’ record with regard to the Jews during the Holocaust was about the best in all of Nazi-occupied Europe; Albanians sheltered Jews more solidly than almost any other occupied people.



Another interesting case, for the purposes of comparison, is that of the Croats. Croatia was not part of the Ottoman Empire, so its social structure was not determined by the Ottoman system. Croatia had a relatively small Jewish community, so its anti-Semitism was fairly typical by the standards of Christian Europe. However, Croat nationalists were almost unique in Europe in the extent to which they were ready to embrace Muslims. Ante Starcevic, the father of integral Croat-nationalism, viewed the Bosnian Muslims as the purest of all Croats. According to the tradition he established, the Bosnian Muslims were the ‘flower of the Croat nation’. This was possible for Croat nationalists because, unlike the Orthodox peoples of the Balkans, Croatia had not been ruled and oppressed by the Ottomans. The Islamophile character of Croat nationalism was, of course, a way for it to lay claim to Bosnia, where the Catholics were only a small minority.



The different ways in which Serb and Croat nationalist ideology perceived the Muslims became apparent during World War II. Serb extreme nationalists – the Chetniks – carried out systematic massacres of Muslims and Catholics, and also murdered Jews or handed them over to the Nazis. Croat extreme nationalists – the Ustashas – carried out systematic massacres of the Orthodox Serbs and Jews. But not of Muslims, as the policy of the Ustashas was to treat Bosnian Muslims as Islamic Croats. In contrast to the nationalism of the Othodox peoples of the Balkans, it was only in the 1990s that the Croat-nationalist mainstream became overtly anti-Islamic; this was due to the policy of the Croatian despot Franjo Tudjman, who aimed to join with the Serbs in partitioning Bosnia. What made the difference for Croat nationalists by the 1990s, compared to the 1940s, was that by then the Muslims had been formally recognised within the Yugoslav constitutional system as a nation in their own right, distinct from the Serbs and Croats. When Muslims could no longer be viewed as Islamic Croats and potentially assimilated, they became open to persecution by expansionist Croat nationalism.



By this period – the 1990s – both Serb and Croat nationalists were more likely to identify with Israel on an anti-Muslim than they were to indulge in anti-Semitism. Although the more extreme elements among Serb and Croat nationalists in the 1990s did sometimes express anti-Semitic views, they were generally astute enough to know the propaganda value of not being seen to be anti-Semitic, and they did try to appeal to Jewish opinion – though not very successfully. Albania and Croatia, therefore, are the exceptions that prove the rule: firstly, that anti-Muslim and anti-Jewish prejudice in the Balkans are essentially similar, in that both are prejudices directed against ethnic groups that have their origins in religious differences; and secondly, that Muslims are targeted and persecuted as an alien ethnic group – like the Jews – not simply as a religious community.



To go back to the case of the Serb Chetniks in World War II: they were an extreme-nationalist movement that systematically persecuted and killed the non-Orthodox population in Bosnia: Muslims, Croats and Jews. The Chetniks were engaged in a vicious war against the Yugoslav Partisans, who were a multinational resistance movement led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The Chetniks identified the Communists with the Jews, but also with the Muslims and Croats. One Chetnik leader even accused the Communists of destroying Orthodox Churches, and building mosques, synagogues and Catholic churches. In World War II, however, it was still possible for the Chetniks to waver between massacring Muslims, and attempting to co-opt them, on the grounds that Bosnian Muslims were ‘really’ Serbs. So as late as World War II, both Serb- and Croat-nationalists could still make some pretence at treating the Muslims as a religious group within their respective nations. One can compare this to the confusion among modern anti-Semites, until quite late in the day, as to whether the Jews were a religious or a racial group.



By the 1990s, however, despite lip service to the traditional nationalist view, that Bosnian Muslims were really just Islamic Serbs or Croats, in practice, this kind of assimilationism was no longer possible or relevant. Muslims were treated in practice as a hated, alien ethnic minority. There was no policy of forced conversion. Serb nationalists, and to a lesser extent Croat nationalists, ethnically cleansed Bosnia of Muslims who spoke their language, much as the Serbian regime attempted to cleanse Kosovo of the Albanians who spoke an entirely different language. Rather like anti-Semites, extreme Serb and Croat nationalists in Bosnia in the 1990s simultaneously viewed Muslims as a racially alien element, while portraying them in their propaganda as part of an international, global threat to Christian Europe.



Of course, there are differences between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism: anti-Semites traditionally portray the global Jewish conspiracy in terms of sneaky, intelligent puppet-masters working behind the scenes, whereas Balkan Islamophobes portray the global Islamic conspiracy in terms of mindless but fully visible – indeed visually striking – fanaticism. Hatred of Islam and Muslims has, for all its intensity as felt by Balkan Christian nationalists, never quite achieved the intensity of being an all-consuming end in itself, as it has for some anti-Semites. And of course, Balkan Islamophobes do not formally treat global Islam as a race, in the way that anti-Semites treat global Jewry as a race. But we are ultimately talking about ideological window-dressing used to justify the same type of persecution and violence.



It is nonsensical to argue that the systematic destruction of mosques and the Islamic heritage in Bosnia by Serbian forces, combined with a propaganda that stressed the role of mujahedin and of foreign Islamic states, was not an expression of Islamophobia, on the grounds that Islamophobia does not exist. But equally, it is nonsensical to argue that this campaign was genuinely motivated by hostility to Islam as an ideology: there was no pretence that Muslims were a danger because they might indoctrinate the Serbian population with subversive views. Serb nationalists in the 1980s and 90s made much of the growing threat of the Bosnian Muslims in Bosnia, and of Albanian Muslims in Serbia. But the danger they presented was not that these groups would spread Islam to the Serbs, and Islamify Serbia. Rather, the danger was that these groups would increasingly outbreed the Serbs, and turn them into increasingly small minorities in their own countries.



Thus, we are not talking about a threat equivalent to the Communist threat, as it was viewed in McCarthy’s US, or to the counter-revolutionary threat, as it was viewed in Stalin’s USSR. Muslim children in Serb-occupied Bosnia were not simply deported along with their parents, as they might have been if they were viewed as the children of subversives. Still less were they subjected to ideological reprogramming. Rather, they were themselves singled out for rape, torture and murder. Muslim women were raped with the stated goal of making them give birth to Serb babies. Biljana Plasvic, the Bosnian Serb vice-president, theorised about the Muslims being a genetically defective offshoot of the Serb nation.



In sum, Islamophobia, in the Bosnian war, was an expression of hatred directed against an ethnic group, or groups. One of the paradoxes of this is that for all the Islamophobic hatred directed against the Balkan Muslim peoples by Balkan Christian nationalists, and indeed by the anti-Muslim bigots in the West who supported them, the Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albanians are among the most secularised Muslim peoples in the world. Just as Jewish atheists will always be the Christ-killers or ritual slaugherers of Christian children in the eyes of certain anti-Semites, so Bosnian Muslim and Albanian atheists will always be jihadis in the eyes of Islamophobes.



This paper was presented at the conference ‘Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Europe: Comparisons - contrasts - connections‘, that took place at University College London on 22-24 June.

Marko Hoare

http://greatersurbiton.wordpress.com/20 ... e-balkans/

[mojgrad]

jos da si preveo na bosanski pa da te razumijemo....... i rekao svoje misljenje pa da odpocnemo diskusiju..

[stari_sarajevski_gospodin]

jos da si preveo na bosanski pa da te razumijemo....... i rekao svoje misljenje pa da odpocnemo diskusiju..

http://translate.google.com/translate_t

bujrum

[mojgrad]

jos da si preveo na bosanski pa da te razumijemo....... i rekao svoje misljenje pa da odpocnemo diskusiju..

http://translate.google.com/translate_t

bujrum

Ma razumijem ja i engleski, ovaj moj gore komentar je vise bio sarkasticno namijenjen. Ne znam zasto ljudi imaju potrebu otvorit temu(bilo cemu da se radi) a ne dat prvo svoje misljenje u vezi postavljene teme. Ili ja nisam pravila foruma dobro procitala...

[Law_and_Order]

too long to read!!! J

edni dizu paniku protiv islama a drugi zauzvrat jos vise potenciraju na "islamofobiji"

za mene su krive obje strane. Dovoljno su zabiberile danasnju situaciju

[IBM]

Kao sto sam pretpostavio. Svi su strucnjaci za sve i svi misle da su oni u pravu.Ali kada trebaju nesta procitati i obrazovati se.Mrsko im je. Jadno

[Vincent Raine]

Kao sto sam pretpostavio. Svi su strucnjaci za sve i svi misle da su oni u pravu.Ali kada trebaju nesta procitati i obrazovati se.Mrsko im je. Jadno

Prevedi bre da te ceo svet razume!

[sojka]

O islamofobiji, jedan primjer Guantanamo..

Nadam se da cete uspjeti da vidite najaktuelnije slike i skrivene snimke. Radi se o djecacicu od 15 godina.
Pakao...

http://nachrichten.t-online.de/c/15/62/ ... 21164.html

Postoji i film malo stariji koji se vjerovatno gledali.

[sojka]

Prevod:

http://www.sarajevo-x.com/clanak/080715097

[sojka]

pod starim temama, ukoliko nekog zanima ispovijest petnaestogodisnjeg djecacica...

http://www.sarajevo-x.com/forum/viewtop ... =6&t=25637

[Bosanac sa dna kace]

too long to read!!! J

edni dizu paniku protiv islama a drugi zauzvrat jos vise potenciraju na "islamofobiji"

za mene su krive obje strane. Dovoljno su zabiberile danasnju situaciju

Mi muslimani:
-krivi smo što postojimo
-mi ne smijemo da dišemo,
-mi nesmijemo da postijmo, a kamoli da se branimo
-ako su nam konačno dozvolili da postojimo, možemo samo bit prljavi i prašljavi beduini ili znojavi i prljavi čobani i šumari.
-mi ne semijemo da se branimo ma kad i kako nas napadali
-mi smo krivi za sva zla ovog svijeta.
-IZVINJAVAMO SE SVIMA ŠTO POSTOJIMO!!!

[seljak_cojek]

too long to read!!! J

edni dizu paniku protiv islama a drugi zauzvrat jos vise potenciraju na "islamofobiji"

za mene su krive obje strane. Dovoljno su zabiberile danasnju situaciju

Mi muslimani:
-krivi smo što postojimo
-mi ne smijemo da dišemo,
-mi nesmijemo da postijmo, a kamoli da se branimo
-ako su nam konačno dozvolili da postojimo, možemo samo bit prljavi i prašljavi beduini ili znojavi i prljavi čobani i šumari.
-mi ne semijemo da se branimo ma kad i kako nas napadali
-mi smo krivi za sva zla ovog svijeta.
-IZVINJAVAMO SE SVIMA ŠTO POSTOJIMO!!!

-Trebamo nositi traku oko lijeve ruke, čisto da nas lakše prepoznaju.

[Latina]

-Trebamo nositi traku oko lijeve ruke, čisto da nas lakše prepoznaju.

Kako si @seljak_cojek ? Otkud takvo beznadje ? Ili je samo sarkazam, ali cemu sarkazam ?

[Bosanac sa dna kace]

too long to read!!! J

edni dizu paniku protiv islama a drugi zauzvrat jos vise potenciraju na "islamofobiji"

za mene su krive obje strane. Dovoljno su zabiberile danasnju situaciju

Mi muslimani:
-krivi smo što postojimo
-mi ne smijemo da dišemo,
-mi nesmijemo da postijmo, a kamoli da se branimo
-ako su nam konačno dozvolili da postojimo, možemo samo bit prljavi i prašljavi beduini ili znojavi i prljavi čobani i šumari.
-mi ne semijemo da se branimo ma kad i kako nas napadali
-mi smo krivi za sva zla ovog svijeta.
-IZVINJAVAMO SE SVIMA ŠTO POSTOJIMO!!!

-Trebamo nositi traku oko lijeve ruke, čisto da nas lakše prepoznaju.

k tomu jos ja sam pripremio zelenu traku sa polumjesecom i zvijezdom srebrene boje

[seljak_cojek]

-Trebamo nositi traku oko lijeve ruke, čisto da nas lakše prepoznaju.

Kako si @seljak_cojek ? Otkud takvo beznadje ? Ili je samo sarkazam, ali cemu sarkazam ?

Dobro sam @Latinice, Mašallah. Kako si ti?
Nije bona beznađe, naprotiv. Narod kaže "Pred zoru je najmračnije!". Svanuće i nama, ubjeđen sam u to.
Moglo bi se reći i da sam pokušao biti sarkastičan, ali je to u stvari više reakcija na pisanja pojedinih učesnika na ovom forumu. Uostalom, stiče se, utisak da je to nekekav opšti tren u medijima. Teroristi su uglavnom muslimani.( ETA i IRA nisu terorističke organizacije.)
Muslimani su neobrazovani, zaostali, evolucija ih je zaobišla, ..... sve se to može pročitati na ovom forumu, i zbog toga sam pomenuo zelenu traku.


Mahsuz selam!!!

[Latina]

Dobro sam @Latinice, Mašallah. Kako si ti?
Nije bona beznađe, naprotiv. Narod kaže "Pred zoru je najmračnije!". Svanuće i nama, ubjeđen sam u to.
Moglo bi se reći i da sam pokušao biti sarkastičan, ali je to u stvari više reakcija na pisanja pojedinih učesnika na ovom forumu. Uostalom, stiče se, utisak da je to nekekav opšti tren u medijima. Teroristi su uglavnom muslimani.( ETA i IRA nisu terorističke organizacije.)
Muslimani su neobrazovani, zaostali, evolucija ih je zaobišla, ..... sve se to može pročitati na ovom forumu, i zbog toga sam pomenuo zelenu traku.


Mahsuz selam!!!

Dobro sam i ja, Bogu hvala.

Ne znam kako da ovo kazem, ali mislim da kada nas ophrvaju problemi, to je znak da se trebamo zagledati u - sebe. Alejkumu selam i sve najbolje.

[IBM]

[dr.gog]

Ne znam kako da ovo kazem, ali mislim da kada nas ophrvaju problemi, to je znak da se trebamo zagledati u - sebe. Alejkumu selam i sve najbolje.

Sasvim dobro sažeto.@seljakčojek ,ne znam jel naglašavaš trendove u novinama koji ne odgovaraju trendovima vjerskih euforija,ili slutiš da se razvija planski animozitet..u skladu sa trendom paranoičnog zatvaranja u ideološke krugove...
...nadalje,ako ne odgovara nečije otrovno pisanje ili tome slično,to je ipak pojedinac,ili manja grupa za polemiku spremnih &uvjek dokonih,što na Forumima ,što u raznim novinama....pri tom su ljudi inteligentni da promaknu svoje stajalište ,kao nešto se samo po sebi podrazumjeva,a ostalo hladno odsijeku kao sociološki devijantno.
Isto mjerilo se kreira na osnovu Potemkinovog sela koje mi nazivamo državom ,entitetom ili pak službenom vjerskom organizacijom.Isto selo su također i lijevi i provjerski magazini,koji opet jedva nalaze novce za opstajanje,pa imamo novinarski spam visokog napona i nebulozne naslovnice,kako u BiH tako i diljem evrope.Prije nekoliko mjeseci imao je "der Spiegel"sjajnu paranoičnu parodiju od naslovnice,sa slikom Bundestaga pod noćnim svjetlom iznad kojega se nalazi polumjesec sa zvijezdom i napis sumornog tona"Njemačka nova Meka...tiha islamizacija".Trendovski politikantska naslovnica je prodala komplet izdanje Spiegela...tabloidi su dobili vjetra u krila od renomiranog sedmičnika i neko vrijeme je prihod bio koliko toliko stabilizovan.
Bitno je naime održati medijski fokus na tajnovitim i zakučastim stvarima,simbolima koji su egzotični za učmali zapad,na ljudima koji su rođenjem i trenutnim zakonima punopravni građani Evrope,s nezgodnim osobinama poput tamnije puti,čudnog outfita,konzervativnih stavova i zatvoreni kao socijalna skupina.Pri tom jedan dio dežurnih izgubljenih slučajeva, kakve ima svaka zajednica,od zemlje u kojoj živi traži da pristane na sve zahtjeve njihovog svjetonazora,i to de facto,jer u krajnoj liniji njihova djelovanja kompromis ne postoji.
Time raznorazni fanatici postaju ličnosti od "posebne opasnosti za ustavni poredak",njihovi slušaoci"rizične grupe podložne ektremističkom manipulisanju",
S vremena na vrijeme neko od istih sociopata pokušava eksplozivom ubrzati tok stvari,opet u skladu SA SVOJIM odn.Vođinim svjetonazorom,i postati antiheroj jednima ,a heroj drugima,dok obitelj hairuje 10-ak hiljada eura krvarine.

Ovdje postaje najzanimljivije.Razne institucije naime svoj opstanak i ogromne budžete osiguravaju upravo zahvaljujući tim opskurnim grupama,koje pomno nadgledaju,infiltriraju lažnim preobraćenicima,i pri tome maltene javno mobilišu visokoobrazovane mlade ljude u razne obavještajne agencije,predočavajući ciljnu grupu-muslimane kao neizbježan dio budućih konflikata i pokušaja rušenja savršenih demokratija.
Mnogo ljudi se upoznaje sa islamom na razne načine i iz tog upoznavanja izvlače različite zaključke...neki pri tom doživljavaju pozitivnu duhovnu promjenu i napredak u životu,stabiliziraju svoju ličnost u jačoj produhovljenosti,sklanjaju se od poroka i nerijetko spašavaju sebi život.
Drugima opet ostaje problem sa vlastitim identitetom ,i prijašnjim psihološkim,zdravstvenim i socijalnim problemima,te nerijetko predstavljaju metu za brojne službene perače mozgova i kojekakve špijune feudalnih arapskih tajnih službi i paravojnih organizacija terorističkog tipa.

Ono što je bizarno je da te protuhe i razni manipulatori imaju više slobode i uspjeha u dominantno kršćanskim sredinama,zemljama gdje je sigurnosni i socijalni sistem mnogo jači i organizovaniji nego u jednoj BiH koja je vojno-politički protektorat pod zajedničkim interesnim nadzorom SAD i najjačih Evropskih država(da se ne zavaravamo sa fatamorganom sigurnosnog jedinstva EU-ono ne postoji niti će ikad postojati)--Njemačke,Francuske,Velike Britanije i Italije.

Tako da na sceni imamo da je u Njemačkoj primjerice godinama bilo sasvim normalno da u prominentnim džamijama razni šejhovi u azilu,štićenici i primaoci socijalne pomoći i dodatka za nezaposlene(uz porodicu do 2.500 -3.000 eura),hladno pozivaju na rat protiv nevjerničkih naroda,rušenje sistema koji podržavaju državnu politiku naspram ratova u afganistanu i Iraku ,ili pak daju podršku cionističkom režimu Izraela.

Kako je njemačka Vlada i Kancelarka osobno,u prisustvu general-inspektora Schneiderhana-prvog vojnika Njemačke vojske,i ministtra odbrane Junga,izjavila da će Njemačka uvijek braniti interese i suverenitet Izraela "na sve zakonske načine koje joj stoje na raspolaganju"..tako je raspoloženje ekstremnih propovjednika proključalo i do dan danas Njemci nemaju pojma kako da smisle djelotvoran sistem za nadzor nad tim likovima,jer im je sudstvo naime tradicionalno nesklono prema prijedlozima bezbjedonosnih institucija,pa razni huškački raspoloženi fanatici još uvijek među Njemcima šire svoju sliku"pravog islama".

I tako traje tihi rat između tajne policije(VfS)i raznih "vojski""humanitarnih komiteta","islamskih naučnika i propovjednika",i "uglednih disidenata"(kako im tepaju ljigavi ubuđali evropski ljevičari),u kojem je žrtva zdravo rasuđivanje građana naspram čitave jedne kulture.

Kad nakon tog pranja mozga i paranoje,isti dođu U BiH,možete zamisliti koju količinu glupih pitanja i predrasuda imaju prema muslimanima u BiH,a ako tome pridodamo propagandu dežurnih entitetskih medija koji se natječu u idiotlucima svake vrste,ugođaj besmisla i zbunjenosti je potpun,do te mjere da normalan čovjek ostane nekad bez teksta.

I da se na koncu vratim,onom što je @latinica napisala u gore citiranome tekstu,jedinu korist,bar ja lično vidim,u takvome vremenu od ove upute :"to je znak da se trebamo zagledati u - sebe. Alejkumu selam i sve najbolje. ".

A o ostalim aspektima,poput ovog što navedoh,pogodnije je pričati na drugom podforumu,pa izvinite ako sam odviše naglasio sigurnosna pitanja..

dr.gog

[Andryana]

Ljudima jednostavno ispiraju mozak svakog dana, vidi se to najvise na TV-u u nekim (pogotovo americkim) serijama, filmovima...ne znam da li ste gledali seriju "the sleepers cell" (spavaci), emitovala se ranije na B92, scenarij te serije (iako je volim gledati), toliko anti-islamski nastrojen bez obzira na to sto u pojedinim epizodama junaci iznose lijepe strane islama...ipak, od kako sam upoznala nekoliko pravih vjernika i meni kao (sad vec bivshem) laiku i neznalici o islamu sad je mnogo sve jasnije...islam je jedna predivna poruka i trebamo je se drzati, ne samo muslimani nego i ostali pametni, otvoreni i ljubavlju ispunjeni ljudi drugih vjera.

P.S. pametnima dosta

[Valbon_1]

Ljudima jednostavno ispiraju mozak svakog dana, vidi se to najvise na TV-u u nekim (pogotovo americkim) serijama, filmovima...ne znam da li ste gledali seriju "the sleepers cell" (spavaci), emitovala se ranije na B92, scenarij te serije (iako je volim gledati), toliko anti-islamski nastrojen bez obzira na to sto u pojedinim epizodama junaci iznose lijepe strane islama...ipak, od kako sam upoznala nekoliko pravih vjernika i meni kao (sad vec bivshem) laiku i neznalici o islamu sad je mnogo sve jasnije...islam je jedna predivna poruka i trebamo je se drzati, ne samo muslimani nego i ostali pametni, otvoreni i ljubavlju ispunjeni ljudi drugih vjera.

P.S. pametnima dosta

Pa...dobro nam dosla...

[shalaedin]

Posto ima dosta forumasa koji su manje-vise islamofobicni.Mislim da nije losa ideja staviti ovaj tekst:

Is Islamophobia equivalent to racism or anti-Semitism ? The view from the Balkans


There is some resistance among liberal intellectuals to the term ‘Islamophobia’, because it is assumed that Islam is a religion, therefore an ideology, and it is questioned if one can be prejudiced against an ideology. Yet such a distinction is not satisfactory from the standpoint of a scholar of the Balkans; or indeed, from the historical standpoint generally. To treat chauvinism against a religious community as being fundamentally different from chauvinism against an ethnic or racial group is to superimpose a modern understanding of religion onto the past. We may believe in the ideals of the separation of church and state; and of religion as a private, personal matter of conscience; but it is anachronistic to impose this liberal ideal onto past human history.



We are all aware of the distinction between religious and racial anti-Semitism, but also of the connections between the two – of the fact that even the Nazis used religious background to determine who was Jewish. In the Balkans, at least, the model for chauvinism that anti-Semitism provides – in which prejudice against a religious community evolves into an ethnic or racial prejudice - is the rule rather than the exception. Religious and ethnic prejudice are not distinct categories, and it makes no historical sense to see them as such.



The Ottoman Empire ruled over much of the Balkans from the late Middle Ages until the nineteenth century, and it was the Ottoman system that laid the basis for modern ethnicity and nationality in the Balkans. The Ottoman empire was organised on the basis of different legal statuses for Muslims and non-Muslims, in which Muslims were the dominant and privileged group but Christians and Jews nevertheless enjoyed a degree of communal autonomy. This laid the basis for the different religious communities to evolve into separate nationalities.



When the Orthodox nationalities of the Balkans rose up against the Ottoman overlords during the nineteenth century with the goal of establishing their independence from the empire, the process involved the expulsion or extermination of much of the non-Christian population, which was identified as an alien, non-national element. This process of ethnic or religious cleansing was directed primarily against the Muslim population that was concentrated in the towns. But it targeted also the Jews, who were also concentrated in the towns and who were, in the eyes of the predominantly peasant and Christian rebels, equally alien and part of the Ottoman presence. This was something that occurred in the violence that accompanied the uprisings themselves, with rebels spontaneously massacring non-Christians. But it also took place more quietly in the decades that followed the establishment of autonomy or independence, as the new governments encouraged ethnic homogenisation.



Thus, for example, in Serbia during the nineteenth century, the number of mosques in the main cities rapidly declined. The Serbian capital of Belgrade was largely Muslim before the nineteenth century. But following the establishment of an autonomous Serbian principality in the first decades of the nineteenth century, the Muslim population was mostly expelled and most of the mosques were destroyed or dismantled. Similarly, the Jewish communities suffered restrictions they had not suffered in the Ottoman period, and were expelled or relocated from the towns outside Belgrade. This, of course, is a generalisation: the extent to which Muslims or Jews were massacred, expelled or persecuted varied according to country and period. This was not a matter of Nazi-style total extermination. Persecution and expulsion alternated and overlapped with efforts at cooption, assimilation and toleration. But the model of nationhood remained very much one that was based on Orthodox Christianity, in which non-Orthodox were, at best, viewed as less national than the Orthodox.



This model of religiously determined nationhood was not adopted only by Orthodox Christians, but also by the Muslim Turks. The establishment of a Turkish nation-state in the 1910s and 1920s involved the extermination or expulsion of literally millions of Christians. Formally, they were Greeks or Armenians. But this included Turkish-speaking Christians who were excluded from the Turkish nation solely because of their religion. Turkish nationhood, therefore, was based on the Muslim religion: it was inclusive of Kurds and other non-Turkish-speaking Muslims who inhabited Anatolia. But it was exclusive of Turkish-speaking Christians.



After establishing their nation-state, the Turks had a rather better record of treating the Jews than did the Balkan Christians. This was a legacy of the fact that the Muslims, as the elite group in the Ottoman Empire, had not viewed the Jews as outsiders in the same way that the Christians had done. But there was still some anti-Jewish activity on the part of the Turkish state which, with Nazi encouragement, reached its peak during World War II. Furthermore, in the great anti-Greek pogrom in Istanbul in 1955, Jews were also targeted.



Another example serves to illustrate the connection between religion and ethnicity in the Balkans. Both Serbia and Croatia entered the modern age with relatively small Jewish communities that could readily assimilate into the dominant Serbian and Croatian nations respectively. By contrast, in Bosnia there was no dominant nationality. So members of the Sephardic Jewish community in Bosnia developed a distinct sense of nationality of their own. They saw themselves as distinct from the Ashkenazim, who were culturally different. And as they were not oppressed by a dominant nationality that treated them as outsiders, they were less receptive to Zionism than were the Jews of most Central European countries. So the Bosnian Sephardim followed the general Bosnian pattern, whereby the different religious communities evolved into different nationalities.



There were some exceptions to the general rule of religiously based nationhood in the Balkans. The Albanians are the only major example of a Balkan nation for which religion is not the determining factor. The most likely explanation is that Albanian nationalism originated with the Catholic population among the Albanian-speakers. And the Catholics were not legally and economically subordinate to Muslim landlords in the way that Orthodox peasants throughout the Balkans were subordinate to Muslim landlords. So there was not the same degree of class oppression tied into the religious divide between Catholics and Muslims among the Albanian-speakers, as there was between Orthodox and Muslims among the Slavic-, Greek- and Turkish-speaking peoples. Interestingly, the Albanians’ record with regard to the Jews during the Holocaust was about the best in all of Nazi-occupied Europe; Albanians sheltered Jews more solidly than almost any other occupied people.



Another interesting case, for the purposes of comparison, is that of the Croats. Croatia was not part of the Ottoman Empire, so its social structure was not determined by the Ottoman system. Croatia had a relatively small Jewish community, so its anti-Semitism was fairly typical by the standards of Christian Europe. However, Croat nationalists were almost unique in Europe in the extent to which they were ready to embrace Muslims. Ante Starcevic, the father of integral Croat-nationalism, viewed the Bosnian Muslims as the purest of all Croats. According to the tradition he established, the Bosnian Muslims were the ‘flower of the Croat nation’. This was possible for Croat nationalists because, unlike the Orthodox peoples of the Balkans, Croatia had not been ruled and oppressed by the Ottomans. The Islamophile character of Croat nationalism was, of course, a way for it to lay claim to Bosnia, where the Catholics were only a small minority.



The different ways in which Serb and Croat nationalist ideology perceived the Muslims became apparent during World War II. Serb extreme nationalists – the Chetniks – carried out systematic massacres of Muslims and Catholics, and also murdered Jews or handed them over to the Nazis. Croat extreme nationalists – the Ustashas – carried out systematic massacres of the Orthodox Serbs and Jews. But not of Muslims, as the policy of the Ustashas was to treat Bosnian Muslims as Islamic Croats. In contrast to the nationalism of the Othodox peoples of the Balkans, it was only in the 1990s that the Croat-nationalist mainstream became overtly anti-Islamic; this was due to the policy of the Croatian despot Franjo Tudjman, who aimed to join with the Serbs in partitioning Bosnia. What made the difference for Croat nationalists by the 1990s, compared to the 1940s, was that by then the Muslims had been formally recognised within the Yugoslav constitutional system as a nation in their own right, distinct from the Serbs and Croats. When Muslims could no longer be viewed as Islamic Croats and potentially assimilated, they became open to persecution by expansionist Croat nationalism.



By this period – the 1990s – both Serb and Croat nationalists were more likely to identify with Israel on an anti-Muslim than they were to indulge in anti-Semitism. Although the more extreme elements among Serb and Croat nationalists in the 1990s did sometimes express anti-Semitic views, they were generally astute enough to know the propaganda value of not being seen to be anti-Semitic, and they did try to appeal to Jewish opinion – though not very successfully. Albania and Croatia, therefore, are the exceptions that prove the rule: firstly, that anti-Muslim and anti-Jewish prejudice in the Balkans are essentially similar, in that both are prejudices directed against ethnic groups that have their origins in religious differences; and secondly, that Muslims are targeted and persecuted as an alien ethnic group – like the Jews – not simply as a religious community.



To go back to the case of the Serb Chetniks in World War II: they were an extreme-nationalist movement that systematically persecuted and killed the non-Orthodox population in Bosnia: Muslims, Croats and Jews. The Chetniks were engaged in a vicious war against the Yugoslav Partisans, who were a multinational resistance movement led by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The Chetniks identified the Communists with the Jews, but also with the Muslims and Croats. One Chetnik leader even accused the Communists of destroying Orthodox Churches, and building mosques, synagogues and Catholic churches. In World War II, however, it was still possible for the Chetniks to waver between massacring Muslims, and attempting to co-opt them, on the grounds that Bosnian Muslims were ‘really’ Serbs. So as late as World War II, both Serb- and Croat-nationalists could still make some pretence at treating the Muslims as a religious group within their respective nations. One can compare this to the confusion among modern anti-Semites, until quite late in the day, as to whether the Jews were a religious or a racial group.



By the 1990s, however, despite lip service to the traditional nationalist view, that Bosnian Muslims were really just Islamic Serbs or Croats, in practice, this kind of assimilationism was no longer possible or relevant. Muslims were treated in practice as a hated, alien ethnic minority. There was no policy of forced conversion. Serb nationalists, and to a lesser extent Croat nationalists, ethnically cleansed Bosnia of Muslims who spoke their language, much as the Serbian regime attempted to cleanse Kosovo of the Albanians who spoke an entirely different language. Rather like anti-Semites, extreme Serb and Croat nationalists in Bosnia in the 1990s simultaneously viewed Muslims as a racially alien element, while portraying them in their propaganda as part of an international, global threat to Christian Europe.



Of course, there are differences between Islamophobia and anti-Semitism: anti-Semites traditionally portray the global Jewish conspiracy in terms of sneaky, intelligent puppet-masters working behind the scenes, whereas Balkan Islamophobes portray the global Islamic conspiracy in terms of mindless but fully visible – indeed visually striking – fanaticism. Hatred of Islam and Muslims has, for all its intensity as felt by Balkan Christian nationalists, never quite achieved the intensity of being an all-consuming end in itself, as it has for some anti-Semites. And of course, Balkan Islamophobes do not formally treat global Islam as a race, in the way that anti-Semites treat global Jewry as a race. But we are ultimately talking about ideological window-dressing used to justify the same type of persecution and violence.



It is nonsensical to argue that the systematic destruction of mosques and the Islamic heritage in Bosnia by Serbian forces, combined with a propaganda that stressed the role of mujahedin and of foreign Islamic states, was not an expression of Islamophobia, on the grounds that Islamophobia does not exist. But equally, it is nonsensical to argue that this campaign was genuinely motivated by hostility to Islam as an ideology: there was no pretence that Muslims were a danger because they might indoctrinate the Serbian population with subversive views. Serb nationalists in the 1980s and 90s made much of the growing threat of the Bosnian Muslims in Bosnia, and of Albanian Muslims in Serbia. But the danger they presented was not that these groups would spread Islam to the Serbs, and Islamify Serbia. Rather, the danger was that these groups would increasingly outbreed the Serbs, and turn them into increasingly small minorities in their own countries.



Thus, we are not talking about a threat equivalent to the Communist threat, as it was viewed in McCarthy’s US, or to the counter-revolutionary threat, as it was viewed in Stalin’s USSR. Muslim children in Serb-occupied Bosnia were not simply deported along with their parents, as they might have been if they were viewed as the children of subversives. Still less were they subjected to ideological reprogramming. Rather, they were themselves singled out for rape, torture and murder. Muslim women were raped with the stated goal of making them give birth to Serb babies. Biljana Plasvic, the Bosnian Serb vice-president, theorised about the Muslims being a genetically defective offshoot of the Serb nation.



In sum, Islamophobia, in the Bosnian war, was an expression of hatred directed against an ethnic group, or groups. One of the paradoxes of this is that for all the Islamophobic hatred directed against the Balkan Muslim peoples by Balkan Christian nationalists, and indeed by the anti-Muslim bigots in the West who supported them, the Bosnian Muslims and Kosovo Albanians are among the most secularised Muslim peoples in the world. Just as Jewish atheists will always be the Christ-killers or ritual slaugherers of Christian children in the eyes of certain anti-Semites, so Bosnian Muslim and Albanian atheists will always be jihadis in the eyes of Islamophobes.



This paper was presented at the conference ‘Antisemitism and Islamophobia in Europe: Comparisons - contrasts - connections‘, that took place at University College London on 22-24 June.

Marko Hoare

http://greatersurbiton.wordpress.com/20 ... e-balkans/

Evo prevoda: Tu je neki otpor među liberalni intelektualci izraz 'Islamophobia', jer se pretpostavlja da je Islam je religija, dakle, jedna ideologija, i to je pitanje ako se može biti pristran prema jednoj ideologiji. Ipak, takva razlika nije zadovoljavajuće sa stanovista učenjak na Balkanu, ili zaista, od povijesnog gledišta općenito. Prema šovinizam protiv vjerske zajednice kao fundamentalno različita od šovinizam protiv jedne etničke ili rasne skupine je da superimpose moderno razumijevanje religije na prošlosti. Mi svibanj vjeruju u ideale, odvajanje crkve i drzave, i religije kao privatna, osobna stvar savjesti, ali je anachronistic nametnuti ovaj liberalni ideal na prošlost ljudske povijesti.



Svi smo svjesni razlikovanju vjerske i rasne anti-semitizma, ali isto tako i na veze između dva - na činjenicu da su čak i nacisti koristili vjerske pozadine kako biste utvrdili koji je bio židovske. Na Balkanu, barem, model za šovinizam da anti-semitizma pruža - u kojoj predrasuda protiv vjerske zajednice u evolves etničkog ili rasnog predrasuda - je pravilo nego izuzetak. Vjerske i etničke predrasude nisu različite kategorije, i to ne povijesnome smislu da vidi ih kao takve.



Osmansko Carstvo vladali nad više od Balkana iz kasnog Srednjeg vijeka do devetnaestom stoljeću, i to je Osmansko sustav koji polože osnovu za moderni etniciteta i nacionalnosti na Balkanu. Osmansko carstvo je organizovao na osnovu različitih pravnih statusi Muslimana i ne-Muslimana, u kojima Muslimani bili su dominantna i povlaštenih grupa, ali kršćani i Židovi ipak uživali u jednom stupnju komunalne autonomije. Ova položi osnovu za različite vjerske zajednice da se razvije u odvojene nacionalnosti.



Kada je pravoslavna nacionalnosti na Balkanu ustali protiv Osmanskog overlords tijekom devetnaestom stoljeću s ciljem uspostave svoju nezavisnost od carstva, procesa koji su uključeni u protjerivanju ili istrebljenja, mnogo je ne-kršćanskog stanovništva, koji je identificiran kao vanzemaljac , Ne-nacionalnih elemenata. Ovaj proces etničkog ili vjerskog čišćenja bio je prvenstveno usmjeren protiv muslimanskog stanovništva koje je koncentrirano u gradovima. Ali ciljane i Židovi, koji su također koncentrirano u gradovima i koji su, u očima pretežno kršćanske seljačke i buntovnici, jednako dalek i dio su turske prisutnosti. To je nešto što se dogodilo u nasilju koje je u pratnji uprisings sami, s buntovnici spontano massacring ne-kršćana. Ali, također je više mirno mjesto u desetljećima koji pođoše za uspostavljanje autonomiju ili nezavisnost, kao nove vlade ohrabrio etničkih homogenizacija.



Tako, na primjer, u Srbiji tijekom devetnaestom stoljeću, broj džamija u glavnim gradovima brzo odbijena. Srpskog kapitala u Beogradu bio je uglavnom Muslimana pred devetnaestom stoljeću. Ali, nakon osnivanja jedne srpske autonomne kneževina u prvim desetljećima u devetnaestom stoljeću, muslimansko stanovništvo je uglavnom protjerani, a većina od džamije uništene su ili rastavljeni. Slično tome, Židovska zajednica pretrpjela ograničenja nisu pretrpjela u Osmanskom periodu, i bili su protjerani ili premješteno iz gradova izvan Beograda. To, naravno, je generalisation: u mjeri u kojoj muslimani ili Židovi su massacred, protjerani ili progonjeni varirao po zemlji i razdoblju. To nije stvar nacističke-style ukupno istrebljenja. Progon i protjerivanje alternated i overlapped s naporima u cooption, asimilacija i tolerancije. A model of nationhood ostao vrlo jednom da je na temelju pravoslavne kršćanstva, u kojoj non-pravoslavne su, u najboljem slučaju, pogledano kao nacionalna manje od pravoslavnih.



Ovaj model religiously određuje nationhood nije bio usvojen samo pravoslavnih kršćana, ali i od strane muslimanskih Turaka. Formiranje jedne turske nacionalne države u 1910s, 1920s uključeni istrebljenja ili protjerivanje doslovno milijuna kršćana. Formalno, oni su Grci i Armenci. Ali, to su turski-speaking kršćana koji su isključeni iz turskog naroda isključivo zbog svoje vjere. Turski nationhood, dakle, bio je baziran na muslimanske vjere: to je uključeno i Kurda i drugih ne-turski-speaking Muslimana koji naseljen Anatolia. Ali to je bio isključivi i turski-speaking kršćani.



Nakon uspostavljanja njihove nacionalne države, Turci su prilično bolje evidenciju o liječenju Židova nego je balkanskih kršćana. To je ostavština na činjenicu da su Muslimani, kao i elitnu grupu u Osmansko Carstvo, nije pogledano Židovima kao vani na isti način na koji kršćani su učinili. No, tu je još neke anti-židovske aktivnosti na dijelu od turskih država koja, uz nacističke ohrabrenje, dosegao je svoj vrhunac za vrijeme Drugog svjetskog rata. Nadalje, u velikoj anti-grčki pogrom u Istanbulu u 1955, Židovi su i ciljane.



Drugi primjer služi da ilustriraju veze između religije i etniciteta na Balkanu. Oba Srbija i Hrvatska ušle u moderno doba uz relativno male židovske zajednice koji bi mogao lako apsorbirati u dominantne srpski i hrvatski odnosno naroda. S druge strane, u Bosni nije bilo dominantna nacionalnosti. Tako je Sephardic članova židovske zajednice u Bosni i Hercegovini razvila je poseban osjećaj državljanstva njihove vlastite. Oni vidješe se kao različita od Ashkenazim, koji su kulturalno različite. I dok su ne tlačio je dominantna nacionalnosti da ih tretiraju kao vani, oni su manje od Cionizam shvatiti da su Židovi u većini srednjoeuropskih zemalja. Tako je bosanski Sephardim slijedili opće bosanski uzorak, pri čemu su različite vjerske zajednice razvio u različite nacionalnosti.



Postojale su neke iznimke u pravilu, religiously temelji nationhood na Balkanu. Albanci su samo glavni primjer jednog balkanskog naroda za koje religije nije determining factor. Najvjerojatniji objašnjenje je da albanski nacionalizam nastao je s katoličkom stanovništvu među albanski-govornika. I katolici nisu pravno i ekonomski podređen Muslimana landlords na način da pravoslavni seljaci cijelom Balkanu bili su podređeni u muslimanske landlords. Tako je ne isti stupanj klasa ugrožavanja vezan u vjerskoj podijele između katolika i muslimana među albanski-zvučnika, kao što je bilo između pravoslavnih i muslimana među-Slavenska, grčki i turski-speaking naroda. Zanimljivo, Albanci 'rekord s obzirom na Židove tijekom holokausta je o najbolje u sve nacističke-okupiranom Europe; Albanaca zaštićenoj Židovi više solidly od gotovo bilo koje druge zauzete osobe.



Još jedan zanimljiv slučaj, za potrebe usporedbe, koja je od Hrvata. Hrvatska nije bila u sastavu Osmanskog Carstva, tako da svojim društveno ustrojstvo nije određena je Osmansko sustav. Hrvatska je imala relativno male židovske zajednice, tako da svojim anti-semitizma je prilično tipičan po standardima kršćanske Europe. Međutim, Hrvati nacionalisti su gotovo jedinstveni u Europi, u mjeri u kojoj su bili spremni da zagrljaju Muslimana. Ante Starčevića, oca integralni Hrvat-nacionalizam, pogledano bosanskih Muslimana kao najčišći od svih Hrvata. Prema predaji je osnovan, bosanskih Muslimana bili su "cvijet hrvatskog naroda". To je moguće za hrvatskog nacionalista, jer, za razliku od pravoslavnih naroda na Balkanu, Hrvatska nije vladao i tlačio po Turcima. The Islamophile karakter hrvatskog nacionalizma je, naravno, jedan način za to da stave tvrde u Bosni, gdje su katolici bili su samo mali manjine.



Na različite načine u kojima Srba i Hrvata, nacionalističkih ideologija razumje Muslimani postalo jasno tijekom Drugog svjetskog rata. Ekstremnih srpskih nacionalista - četnici - provodi sustavno masakre od muslimana i katolika, kao i ubijale Židove ili ruku nad njima na nacisti. Hrvata ekstremnih nacionalista - Ustashas - provodi sustavno masakre, pravoslavni Srbi i Židovi. Ali ne i od Muslimana, kao i politika u Ustashas je prema bosanskim Muslimanima kao Hrvatima islamske. Za razliku od nacionalizma, Othodox naroda na Balkanu, to je samo u 1990-ih da je Hrvat-nacionalista postao glavna overtly anti-Islamic; je to zbog politike Hrvatskog despot Franjo Tuđman, koji s ciljem da se pridruže s Srbi u Bosni particioniranje. Što je napravio razliku za hrvatskog nacionalista od 1990-ih, u odnosu na 1940s, koji je do tada Muslimani su bili formalno priznato u jugoslovenskim ustavnim sustav kao narod u svojoj pravo, različita od Srba i Hrvata. Kad Muslimani, ne mogu se gleda kao islamski Hrvati i potencijalno assimilated, oni je postao otvoren za progon po expansionist hrvatskog nacionalizma.



Po ovom periodu - 1990-ih - kako Srba i Hrvata nacionalista su vjerojatno prepoznati s Izraelom na jednom anti-muslimanske nego su se upuštati se u anti-semitizma. Iako je više elemenata između Srba i Hrvata nacionalista u 1990-ih je ponekad izražavaju antisemitskih pregleda, oni su uglavnom dovoljno pronicljiv da znaš i propagande vrijednost ne vide da se antisemitskih, i oni pokušati žalba židovske mišljenje -- Iako nije vrlo uspješno. Albanija i Hrvatska, dakle, da su iznimke dokazuju pravilo: prvo, da je anti-muslimanskih i anti-židovske predrasuda na Balkanu su u osnovi slične, u obje su predrasude da je usmjerena protiv etničkih skupina koje su njihova podrijetla u vjerske razlike; drugo, da se Muslimani su ciljani i progonili kao stranac etničkih grupa - kao što su Židovi - ne samo kao vjerska zajednica.



Za povratak u slučaju srpske četnici u Drugom svjetskom ratu: oni su jedan ekstrem-nacionalistički pokret koji sustavno progonjeni i ubijani ne-pravoslavne stanovništva u Bosni i Hercegovini: Muslimani, Hrvati i Židovi. The četnici su sudjelovali u ratu protiv pokvaren jugoslovenske partizani, koji su multinacionalna pokreta otpora dovela je Komunistička partija Jugoslavije. Četnici su identificirali komunista sa Židovima, ali i sa Muslimanima i Hrvatima. Jedan četničkog lidera čak i optuženi je komunista uništavati pravoslavne crkve, zgrade i džamije, sinagoge i Katoličke crkve. U II svjetskog rata, međutim, to je još uvijek moguće za četnici na kolebati između massacring Muslimana, i pokusava co-opt ih, na osnovi bosanskih Muslimana koji su bili 'stvarno' Srba. Tako kasno kao svjetskog rata, i Srba i Hrvata-nacionalista mogao učiniti još neki izgovor u liječenju Muslimane kao vjerska grupa unutar njihovih naroda. One mogu ovo usporediti s konfuzija među modernim antiglobalistickim, do prilično kasno u dan, kao i da li su Židovi bili vjerske ili rasne skupine.



Do 1990-ih, međutim, unatoč usna usluga na tradicionalni nacionalistički pogled, da se bosanski Muslimani su stvarno samo islamski Srbi ili Hrvati, u praksi, ovakav assimilationism je ne moguće ili na koje se odnosi. Muslimani su u praksi tretira kao zamrziti, vanzemaljac etničke manjine. Nije bilo politike prisilnog obraćenja. Srpskih nacionalista, te u manjoj mjeri hrvatskog nacionalista, etnički očisti od Muslimana Bosne koji je govorio njihovim jezikom, koliko je srpski režim je pokušao da očisti Kosovo od Albanaca koji je govorio sasvim drukčiji jezik. Umjesto kao antiglobalistickim, ekstremnih Srba i Hrvata nacionalista u Bosni i Hercegovini u 1990-ih istovremeno pogledano Muslimana kao rasno stran element, dok je portret ih u njihove propagande kao dio međunarodne, globalna prijetnja kršćanskoj Europi.



Naravno, postoje razlike između Islamophobia i anti-semitizma: antiglobalistickim tradicionalno prikazuju globalne židovske zavjeru u smislu sneaky, inteligentni marioneta-majstora koji rade iza kulisa, dok je Balkan Islamophobes prikazuju globalne islamske zavjeru u smislu mindless, ali u potpunosti vidljivi - doista vizualno udarnim - fanatizma. Mržnju prema islamu i muslimanima je, za sav njegov intenzitet osjećao kao po Balkana Christian nacionalista, nikad dosta postigle, intenzitet se jednom sve trajati kraja u sebi, jer je za neke antiglobalistickim. I naravno, Balkan Islamophobes ne formalno tretirati kao globalna Islam utrke, na način da se na antiglobalistickim tretirati kao globalna Jewry utrke. Ali smo na kraju krajeva govorimo o ideološki window-dressing koriste da bi opravdale isti tip progona i nasilja.



To je besmislen da objašnjavati da je sustavno uništavanje džamija i islamske baštine u Bosni i Hercegovini od strane srpskih snaga, u kombinaciji s jedne propagande koja je naglasio ulogu mudžahedina i stranih islamska država, nije bila izraz Islamophobia, na osnovi koje se Islamophobia ne postoji. Ali jednako je besmislen da objašnjavati da je ova kampanja je zaista motivirani by neprijateljstvo prema islamu kao ideologije: nije bilo pravo da Muslimani bili su opasnost jer su možda indoctrinate srpskog stanovništva s subverzivni pregleda. Srpskih nacionalista u 1980s i 90ih je napravio puno na rastućoj opasnosti od bosanskih Muslimana u Bosni i albanskih muslimana u Srbiji. No, opasnost se predstavila je da ove grupe ne bi proširila na islam Srbe i Islamify Srbije. Naprotiv, u opasnosti je da ove grupe bi sve outbreed Srbi, i okrenuti ih u sve male manjina u svojim zemljama.



Dakle, mi se ne govori o opasnosti ekvivalentna komunističke opasnosti, kao što je to pogledano McCarthy je u SAD-u, ili na counter-revolucionarni prijetnja, kao što je to pogledano Staljin u SSSR-a. Muslimanske djece u srpskom okupacijom Bosne nisu bili deportovani jednostavno zajedno s roditeljima, kao da su, ako su kao djeca subversives. Još manje su oni podvrgnuti ideološke reprogramiranju. Naprotiv, oni su sami izdvajani da bi se silovanje, mučenje i ubojstvo. Muslimanske žene su silovane s izjavio je cilj stvaranje im dati rođenja do srpske bebe. Biljana Plasvic, bosanskih Srba potpredsjednik, theorised o Muslimanima kao genetski defektni bijeg od srpskog naroda.



U sam, Islamophobia, u bosanski rat, bila je izraz mržnje usmjerenih protiv jedne etničke grupe, ili grupe. Jedan od paradoxes ovoga je da za sve Islamophobic mržnje usmjerenih protiv balkanskih naroda od strane Muslimana Balkana Christian nacionalista, i zapravo je anti-muslimanskih bigots na Zapadu koji ih podržan, bosanski Muslimani i kosovski Albanci su među najviše secularised Muslimanskog naroda u svijetu. Kao židovske ateisti uvijek će biti Krist-ubice ili ritual slaugherers kršćanske djece u očima nekih na antiglobalistickim, tako bosanskih Muslimana i albanski ateisti uvijek će biti jihadis u očima Islamophobes.



Ovaj rad je predstavljen na konferenciji 'Antisemitism i Islamophobia u Europi: Usporedbe - contrasts - veza', da je uzeo mjesto at University College London na 22-24 lipnja.

[Fair Life]

[dr.gog]

Neka je vala neko bio vrijedan i nešto,konačno, preveo

[Ha-bee-ba]

Lookin' real nice!

[dino_sara]

Islam je prijetnja!!!( kao islam= terorizam) Kazu pojedini ameri, holandjani, britanci,njemci....
Ljudi danas kao i uvijek vladaju mediji. Pogotovo u americi, naprave betmena ili spajdermena i 10% amerikanaca vjeruje da tako nesto i postoji. E zamislite sada non-stop na tv novinama internetu pisati o terorizmu terorizmu i terorizmu. NJih vise ne zanima KKK njih vise ne zanima ETA njih vise ne zanima IRA njih ne zanima nista osim Islama u kojem vide najvecu prijetnju. Boze radi cega oni to rade???? Crno zlato ljudi to je problem br.1. Znaju oni dobro sto je Islam da je to miroljubiva vjera. ( da nepisem o tornjevima nadam se da je neko citao o tome, zlatu koje je bilo u tornjevima, da su padali slobodnim padom, da su bili minirani itd itd).

Spas je u jedinstvu, skolstvu, pameti i mladima.