aaa misliš ovaj:TheMule wrote:Nesto prije nego sto je unistio Hrast, unistio je teretni britanski brod SS Bosnia
http://www.wrecksite.eu/imgBrowser.aspx?8978
Ja to smetnuo skroz...
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aaa misliš ovaj:TheMule wrote:Nesto prije nego sto je unistio Hrast, unistio je teretni britanski brod SS Bosnia
Britanski teretni brod S.S. Bosnia je prvi brod koji je potopila podmornica U-47, pod komandom kapetana korvete (dakle majora, a na poručnika) Günthera Priena i to već 05. septembra 1939-e, dakle samo par dana nakon početka drugog svjetskog rata.TheMule wrote:Nesto prije nego sto je unistio Hrast, unistio je teretni britanski brod SS Bosnia
Ne.8tigar8 wrote:Njemacke panzer snage?
SSSR podmorničari i marinci su imali ogromne gubitke takođe...da nisi mislio na savezničke bombarderske posade? Oni su dobro bili izdraufani...Seawolf wrote:Ne.8tigar8 wrote:Njemacke panzer snage?
Da pomognem, radi se o jednom rodu među savezničkim armijama/vazduhoplovstvima/mornaricama.
Tako je. Posade strateških bombardera američkog ratnog vazduhoplovstva su imale oko 50% poginulih ili nestalih.Lajavikrelac wrote:...da nisi mislio na savezničke bombarderske posade? Oni su dobro bili izdraufani...
od tih 300 000 preko pola su bili italijani i to tada vec nije bio korpus nego armija koju je vodio Von Arnimgost iz ZG wrote:11 stranica teme o Njemačkoj vojsci u WWII - a niko nije spomenuo Afrika korpus i Erwina Rommela?
Najcjenjeniji njemački general/feldmaršal E Rommel - jednako cijenjen i popularan u Njemačkoj ali i na savezničkoj strani.
Profesionalni vojnik, s genijalnim strateškim potezima, nikad nacist, ljudski/fer odnos s ratnim zarobljenicim
Afrika korpus - najpopularniji dio njemačke vojske. Nakon '43 i konačnog poraza u sj.Africi, cca. 300 tisuća završilo u USA kao zarobljenici i dočekali mirno kraj rata
italijanske trupe koje su unistene prije dolaska romela su bile pjesadiske trupe koje su britanci unistili zahvaljujuci tome sto su njihove jedinice bile skoro sve motorizovane i sto protiv njihovih oklopnih jedinica italijani nisu nista imali efikasnogost iz ZG wrote:![]()
bez puno polemiziranja i "navijanja" za bilo koju stranu ... činjenice su:
Njemci tj. Afrika korpus i Rommel su došli u sjevernu Afriku 1941.pomoći Talijanima nakon katastrofalnih vojnih poraza(Talijani su ispušili i u Grčkoj neposredno prije afričke kampanje)
Izjednjačavati zasluge 41-42 je malo smiješno
Danas, nakon 60+ godina, kao glavna Rommelova taktika se spominje kombinacija panzer-tenkovskog napada, privremeno povlačenje i uništavanje britanske tehnike čuvenim topovima 88 ... uz konstantno nadgledanje bitke iz malih izviđačkih aviona
'43 El Alamein ... čak i Britanci danas priznaju, bitka je dobivena zbog loše opskrbljenosti/logistike Rommelovih trupa, demoraliziranosti Talijana i uz pomoć puno sreće
Slažem se da je nakon toga, Rommel pri povlačenju koristio Talijanske zalihe - ali ništa više od toga
Također, slažem se da je nakon zadnje bitke kod Casserine u Tunisu, dio zarobljenih bio i Talijani, no činjenice govore o približno istom broju zarobljenih Njemačkih vojnika i u sj. Africi kao i u Staljingradu
The Italian Royal Army fought this battle in a way that can be summarized by the sacrifice of the Division Folgore: the historian Renzo De Felice wrote that "...of the 5.000 "Folgore" paratroopers sent to Africa 4 months before, the survived were only 32 officers and 262 soldiers, most of them wounded. Before the surrender, they shot until the last ammo and the last hand-grenade...
alibegoa u africi jeste zarobljeno vise njemaca, ali operacija blue je kostala njemce i saveznike preko 750 000 ljudi, a u staljingradskom djepu okruzeno je 300 000 njemaca, ali do okoncanja operacije prezivjelo ih je oko 60-70 000Allied press reports of Italian military prowess in the Second World War were almost always dismissive. British wartime propaganda trumpeted the destruction of the Italian 10th Army by a significantly smaller British force during the early phase of the North African Campaign. The propaganda from this Italian collapse, which was designed to boost British morale during a bleak period of the war, left a lasting impression. The later exploits of Rommel and German accounts of events tended to disparage their Italian allies and downplay their contributions; these German accounts were used as a primary source for the Axis side by English-language historians after the war.Kenneth Macksey wrote in 1972 that after the split in the Italian state and the reinforcement of fascist Italy by German troops, "the British threw out the Italian Chicken only to let in the German Eagle," for example.
Some more recent scholars have attempted to reassess the performance of the Italian forces, notably James Sadkovich, Peter Haining, Vincent O'Hara, and Ian Walker. Contemporary British reports ignored an action of Bir El Gobi where a battalion of a battalion of Giovani Fascisti held up the 11th Indian Brigade and destroyed dozens of tanks, and Sadkovich, Walker, and others have found numerous other examples of actions where Italian forces performed strongly, yet are rarely discussed by most histories. During the Tunisian Campaign, where Italian units were involved in most encounters, such as Kasserine Pass, Mareth, Akarit and Enfidaville, it was observed by General Alexander that "...the Italians fought particularly well, outdoing the Germans in line with them". Rommel himself also conceded praise on several occasions. Other times, German mistakes were blamed on Italians, or the Germans left the Italians in hopeless situations where failure was unavoidable. Questionable German advice, broken promises, and security lapses had direct consequences at Matapan, in the convoy war and North Africa. Rommel often retreated leaving immobile infantry units exposed, withdrew German units to rest even though the Italians had also been in combat, would deprive the Italian's of their share of captured goods, ignore Italian intelligence, seldom acknowledge Italian successes and often resist formulation of joint strategy.
In addition, Italian 'cowardice' did not appear to be more prevalent than the level seen in any army, despite claims of wartime propaganda. Ian Walker wrote:
....it is perhaps simplest to ask who is the most courageous in the following situations: the Italian carristi, who goes into battle in an obsolete M14 tank against superior enemy armour and anti-tank guns, knowing they can easily penetrate his flimsy protection at a range where his own small gun will have little effect; the German panzer soldier or British tanker who goes into battle in a Panzer IV Special or Sherman respectively against equivalent enemy opposition knowing that he can at least trade blows with them on equal terms; the British tanker who goes into battle in a Sherman against inferior Italian armour and anti-tank guns, knowing confidently that he can destroy them at ranges where they cannot touch him. It would seem clear that, in terms of their motto Ferrea Mole, Ferreo Cuore, the Italian carristi really had "iron hearts", even though as the war went on their "iron hulls" increasingly let them down.
The problems that stand out to all historians, however, pertain to Italian strategy and equipment. Italy's equipment was not up to the standard of either the Allied or the German armies; an account of the defeat of the Italian 10th army noted that the incredibly poor quality of the Italian artillery shells saved many British soldiers' lives. More crucially, they lacked suitable quantities of equipment of all kinds and their high command did not take necessary steps to plan for most eventualities. This was compounded by Mussolini assigning unqualified political favourites to key positions. Mussolini also dramatically overestimated the ability of the Italian military at times, sending them into situations where failure was likely such as the invasion of Greece.
Ovo je tačno slažem seTacticus wrote: do nasega rata imao sam misljenje prema italijanima koje je bilo uvazeno u jaavnosti kao kukavicama, onda sam utvrdio da je ponasanje italijanske vojske u WW2 bilo ipak daleko vise zasnovano na losoj opremi jer musolini je svoju vojsku opremio 1930-5 sa najmodernijim nauruzanjem, ali ubrzanim nauruzavanjem prvenstveno njemaca od tog perioda italijansko oruzije je do 1940 bilo jos donekle na nivou, ali od tada je samo postajalo beznadezno zastarjelo i radi daleko losije industrije naspram ostalih ucesnica rata italijani nisu mogli na vrjeme zamjeniti svoje nauruzanje
takodjer su im veci dio oficira bili lose kvalitete jer su na mjesta dolazili partiskom duznoscu (ljubljenje guzica), a ne napredovanjem u sluzbi
a za razliku od njemaca italijani nisu sljepo vjerovali svojem diktatoru i shvatili su na vrjeme gdje ih ovaj vodi
i pored svega toga dobar dio (oko pola) italijanskih vojnika borilo se hrabro, pozrtvovano i vjesto cesto
Tacticus wrote:
italijanske trupe koje su ...
italijani u grckoj su razbijeni radi toga sto je ...

gost iz ZG wrote:II svj. rat Sjeverna Afrika, ukratko
Ljeto 1940. Italija objavljuje rat Britaniji ... sporadične borbe s Britanskim snagama na granici Egipta i Libije
Kraj 1940. britanska ofenziva “Compass“, totalno uništena Talijanska 10.armija, ostatatak u kolapsu i “bježaniji“
Početak 1941. u pomoć dolazi DAK (Deutsches Afrika korps) i Rommel ... operacijom “Sonnenblume“ konsolidira osovinske snge i uglavnom napreduje prema istoku/Nilu
U svim ratnim izvješćima, E.Rommel kritizira stanje Talijanskih saveznika i opisuje ih kao “beskorisni uteg“
Velika prekretnica je bitka kod El Alameina ... Talijani su u totalnom rasulu, dok Afrički korpus pri povlačenju sve do Tunisa, ipak zadaje probleme Britancima (snagama Commonwealtha)
Rommel je već teže bolestan (u Njemačkoj) mijenja ga Arnim ... klanac Kasserine u Tunisu je zadnja njemačka pobjeda – protiv novopridošlih USA vojnika
Sredinom 1943. konačna kapitulcija snaga Afričkog korpusa; točnije 275.000 zarobljenih njemačkih vojnika
90% od 47.017 vojnika nepoznate nacionalnosti su bile italijanske kolonijalne formacije, a pored od tebe navedenog DAK-a dosao je najbolji dio italiijanske vojske tj. 20 motorizovani korpus + jos neke elite jedinice kao padobranci iz Folgore divizijeWriter Rick Atkinson states that Axis losses remain uncertain, and due to numerous factors, it is estimated that the German Army lost 8,500 men killed during the campaign while the Italian Army lost 3,700 men killed. Atkinson estimates that a further 40-50,000 Axis soldiers were wounded.The British official campaign historian Major-General I.S.O. Playfair claims the total number of unwounded prisoners taken, according to Allied records, amounted to 238,243 men; 101,784 Germans, 89,442 Italians, and 47,017 men of an unspecified nationality. Atkinson also states these figures and states that a quarter of a million men captured is a “reasonable estimate”.Playfair notes that the American Official History claims 275,000 Axis soldiers captured, an 18th Army Group calculation of 244,500, Rommel's estimate of 130,000 Germans captured, and von Arnim's estimate of 100,000 German and 200,000 Italian captured.